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MARISA J. MAZZOTTA, JAMES J. OPALUCH AND
THOMAS A. GRIGALUNAS*
Natural Resource Damage
Assessment: The Role of Resource
Restoration
ABSTRACT
To date, methods for determining compensation for spill-related
natural resource damages have focused on the monetary value of
resources damaged by a spill or scientific analyses of resource
restoration. This paper suggests an alternative approach that in-
tegrates legal concepts of public trust, economic definitions of com-
pensation, and scientific approaches to restoration. The approach
is based on a definition of restoration as resource-based compen-
sation-a remedy for damages wherein alternative restoration ac-
tions are identified that provide "equally valued" resources as those
lost due to the spill. This provides an explicit balancing between
the benefits obtained from restoration and losses due to the spill
to assure that the public is made whole. The least costly alterna-
tive that makes the public whole is selected as the cost effective al-
ternative.
INTRODUCTION
Restoration plays a central role in determining compensation
for natural resources injured' by hazardous releases or oil spills under
both the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA)2 and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA).3 In
Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior (the Ohio Decision), the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded
that restoration is the preferred means of compensation for spills of
hazardous substances. 4 Similarly, the Oil Pollution Act explicitly states
* Department of Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, Rhode
Island 02881. We gratefully acknowledge funding from University of Rhode Island Sea
Grant Program and from the RI Agricultural Experiment Station (AES #2920). All views
expressed in this paper are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the
views of the funding agencies.
1. Injury is an adverse change in the chemical or physical quality or the viability of
a natural resource. For example, injury includes mortality and physical impairment of
biological resources (e.g., loss of reproductive capacity) or contamination of other
resources (e.g., oil slicks on surface waters or shorelines, or hazardous substances in
groundwater).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (Supp. IV 1992).
4. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F. 2d 432, 444, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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that compensation for oil spills is to be based on "the cost of restoring,
rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged
resources," plus "the diminution in value of those natural resources
pending restoration," plus "the reasonable costs of assessing those
damages".5
This paper discusses resource restoration as a remedy for in-
juries to natural resources. We present a definition of restoration as re-
source-based compensation, whereby compensation takes the form of
restored resources, and we explore new methods for determining the
appropriate restoration level and for choosing among restoration pro-
grams. The methods that we suggest integrate economic concepts of
compensation, legal concepts based on the public trust doctrine, and
scientific approaches to restoration.
First, we describe the legal framework that provides compen-
sation for natural resource injuries. We then describe a case study, that
of the Amazon Venture oil spill, which will be used to provide illustra-
tions and examples throughout the paper. Finally, we discuss some prob-
lems that arise in defining and implementing restoration, and suggest
methods for addressing some of these problems.
RESTORATION UNDER CERCLA AND OPA
CERCLA NRDA Regulations and the Ohio Decision
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA) provides the statutory basis for compen-
sating the public for injuries to natural resources resulting from re-
leases of hazardous substances. The original CERCLA Natural Resource
Damage Assessment (NRDA) regulations promulgated by the De-
partment of Interior (DOI) stated that damages were to be measured
as the "lesser of" the cost of restoration and the diminution in use val-
ues for the injured resources.6 The preamble to the regulations stated
5. 33 U.S.C. §2706(d)(1) (Supp IV 1992).
6. Natural Resource Damage Assessments, Final Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 27674 (1986).
Following DOI, this paper uses the term "restoration" as encompassing all actions to
restore, rehabilitate, replace, or acquire the equivalent of injured natural resources. "Use
value" generally refers to the monetized measure of benefits that people attach to physical
use of a resource, such as beach use or water drawn from public sources for residential
uses. This "social value" is commonly measured by economists by the aggregate willingness
to pay by members of society to avoid a specific loss of natural resources. Hence, social
value is anthropocentric and reflects individuals' preferences and their ability to pay for
the services provided by resources. Serious measurement problems arise in many cases,
especially when the services lost are not traded in commercial markets, such as lost
recreational uses, or when the services provided by the ecosystem are uncertain or
unknown. Discussion of methods for measuring social values is beyond the scope of this
paper. For additional information, see Water Resources Council, United States Department
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that "[tihe rule takes into consideration existing common law rules for
developing a theory of natural resource damages .... The money
awarded as compensation using common law principles represents a
rough measure that approximately represents the value of the thing
that is lost."7 Thus, the rule is based on the common law concept that
compensation should make the injured party whole'in the least costly
manner.
The original regulations were immediately challenged in court
by industry representatives, state governments, and environmental
groups.8 The Ohio Decision addressed several important issues, including
the "lesser of" rule, which the court overturned. 9 This rule was chal-
lenged by state and environmental petitioners, who argued that Con-
gress intended damages awarded to at least cover restoration of the
injured resources. 10 The petitioners contended that lost-use-value would
generally be less than the cost of restoration, and consequently, in most
cases, damages awarded would not be sufficient to pay for restoring
the injured resources.11
DOI defended the "lesser of" rule by arguing that Congress' in-
tent was unclear, that DOI was given the authority to decide how dam-
ages should be measured, and that its rule should be upheld as long
as it was not unreasonable or inconsistent with the statutory purpose.1
One important issue in DOI's arguments over the "lesser of" rule was
that of economic efficiency. DOI defended its rule as being economi-
cally efficient, because the public would be fully compensated either
by restoring the injured resources or by receiving an amount of money
equal to the lost value of the resources, and thus the "lesser of" rule
would compensate the public at the lowest possible cost.13
However, the court ruled that an important reason for CER-
CLA's natural resource damage provisions was Congress' dissatisfac-
tion with common law remedies for natural resource damages. 14 The
court indicated that Congress had expressed a distinct preference for
restoration over compensation for the lost value of the resources.15 This
preference was expressed in the requirement that all money collected
be spent on restoration. 16 Thus, if use value is less than the restora-
of the Interior, Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines for Water and
Related Land Resources Implementation Studies, (1983); United States Department of
the Interior, Type B Technical Information Document: Techniques to Measure Damages
to Natural Resources (1987).
7. 51 Fed. Reg. 27680.
8. Ohio, 880 F.2d at 438.
9. Id. at 441-459, 481.
10. Id. at 441.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 442, 443.
13. Id. at 443, 444, 456.
14. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
15. Id. at 444, 459.
16. Id. at 444445.
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tion cost, then the "lesser of" rule will not provide adequate funds to
restore the resources fully, so that the public is not made whole.17
One possible interpretation of congressional intent is that full
restoration should be carried out in each and every case, "regardless
of cost and regardless of whether anybody cares," in which case DOI's
argument regarding economic efficiency becomes irrelevant.18 How-
ever, the decision to overturn the "lesser of" rule was based on the
court's interpretation that the intention of Congress was not to forego
efficiency, but that "Congress' refusal to view use value and restora-
tion cost as having equal presumptive legitimacy merely recognizes
that natural resources have value that is not readily measured by tra-
ditional means." 19
In fact, the legislative history suggests that Congress intended
two exceptions to restoration costs as a measure of damages: if restora-
tion is technically infeasible, or if restoration costs are "grossly dis-
proportionate" to the value of services foregone. 20 The court interpreted
this to mean that Congress rejected the idea that the value of resources
can always be accurately measured, stating that:
tlo say that Congress placed a thumb on the scales in favor
of restoration is not to say that it forswore the goal of effi-
ciency. 'Efficiency,' standing alone, simply means that the
chosen policy will dictate the result that achieves the great-
est value to society. Whether a particular choice is efficient
depends on how the various alternatives are valued .... Con-
gress was skeptical of the ability of human beings to mea-
sure the true 'value' of a natural resource.21
Thus, the emphasis on restoration unless "grossly dispropor-
tionate" was meant to capture elements of public values for resources
that might otherwise be missed, such as nonuse values. This is con-
sistent with the public trust doctrine, wherein the trustee22 acts on be-
half of the public to protect the public interest in natural resources, not
on behalf of the resources themselves. However, Congress did not pro-
vide a definition of "grossly disproportionate." The court stated that
"the rule might hinge on the relationship between restoration cost and
17. Id.
18. W. Hanemann, Natural Resource Damages for Oil Spills in California, in Natural
Resource Damages: Law and Economics 555, 573 (K. Ward & J. Duffield, eds., 1992).
19. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 457 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
20. Id. at 456.
21. Id. at 456-57.
22. Within the context of CERCLA and OPA, trustees are members of the federal
agencies, state agencies, foreign governments or Indian tribes that are specifically
designated to act on behalf of the relevant public to carry out natural resource damage
assessments and restoration actions. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A) (1988); 33 U.S.C. §2706(a)-
(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
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use value (e.g., damages are limited to three-times the amount of use
value)." 23
DOI Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
The April 29, 1991 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) is-
sued by DOI addressed the rulings of the Ohio Decision.24 In the NPR,
restoration is defined generally to include "restoration, rehabilitation,
replacement, and/or acquisition of equivalent" of injured natural re-
sources, and the appropriate measure of damages is the estimated cost
of the selected restoration alternative plus lost interim values for re-
sources pending restoration. 2
5
The NPR enumerates ten factors to be considered by the trustee
in choosing restoration programs.26 These are stated as minimum fac-
tors to be considered "among other things" 27 which "when considered
together, would encompass the 'grossly disproportionate' determina-
tion suggested by the court."28 Trustees may apply different weights
to each factor, and the various restoration alternatives may balance these
factors in different ways.29 The NPR currently provides the only avail-
able guidance regarding restoration within the context of natural re-
source damage assessments. Yet, this guidance is not explicit or
comprehensive. For example, no specific methodologies are discussed.
Absence of explicit guidance will almost certainly lead to lengthy and
expensive litigation in many cases.
Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA)
OPA also expresses a preference for natural resource restora-
tion over monetary compensation?30 Natural resource damages under
23. Ohio, 880 F.2d, at 443 n.7. Note that the court employs a nonstandard definition
of the term "use value," which includes "passive use" or nonuse values, such as existence
value-the value associated with merely knowing that a resource continues to exist.
24. 56 Fed. Reg. 19752 (1991) (to be codified in 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (proposed Apri. 29,
1991). To date, final regulations have not been promulgated. As of July 22, 1993, DOI
has reopened the period for public comment in order to obtain further comment on
nonuse value and its measurement. 58 Fed. Reg. 39328 (1993).
25. 56 Fed. Reg. 19756.
26. 56 Fed. Reg. 19757. The ten factors are technical feasibility, expected costs vs.
expected benefits, cost-effectiveness, results of response actions, potential for additional
injury from the proposed action, natural recovery period, ability of the resource to
recover with or without alternative actions, acquisition of land when restoration is not
possible, potential effects on human health and safety, and consistency with federal and
state laws and policies. Id.
27. Id. at 19757.
28. Id. at 19758.
29. Id. at 19757.
30. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1992). Note that the CERCLA NRDA regulations,
when finalized, will be applicable to hazardous substance spills. Additionally, the
CERCLA Natural Resource Damage Assessment regulations apply to oil spills until the
Winter 19941
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OPA are defined in the statutes as the cost of restoring, rehabilitating,
replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the injured resources, plus the
diminution in value of those resources pending restoration, plus rea-
sonable damage assessment costs.31 As under CERCLA, sums recov-
ered are to be retained by the trustee in a revolving trust account "for
use only to reimburse or pay costs incurred by the trustee under...
[§2706(c)] ... with respect to the damaged resources," 32 where sub-
section (c) requires the trustee to "develop and implement a plan" for
restoration.33
This implies that the trustee is required to implement the same
restoration plan upon which it bases its damage assessment. This is
consistent with Puerto Rico r. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, where compensation
in the amount of the costs of purchasing lower trophic organisms from
a scientific catalog was rejected because there was no intention of ac-
tually carrying out this restoration program. 34 Thus, restoration costs
should be the cost of carrying out an actual program for making the
public whole, not merely a means of calculating a dollar amount to be
spent in some unrelated manner.
The Case of the Amazon Venture Oil Spill
The Amazon Venture oil spill will be used to provide a context
to illustrate the concepts discussed in this paper.35 The tanker Amazon
Venture spilled approximately 500,000 gallons of No. 6 fuel oil into the
lower Savannah River near Savannah, Georgia on December 4-6, 1986.
Included in the impacted area is the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge,
which provides a wide variety of services to wildlife, and hence ulti-
mately provides various services3 6 to the public. The refuge serves as
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration develops regulations under the Oil
Pollution Act. A principal reason for the delay of both rules has been the controversy
surrounding nonuse value and its measurement. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments
Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 58 Fed. Reg. 4601 (1993).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 2706(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
32. Id. §2706(f).
33. Id. § 2706(c)(1)(C).
34. Puerto Rico v. Steamship Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F2d 652, 676-77 (1st Cir. 1980).
35. The spill information provided below was obtained from J. Michel, Natural Resource
Damage Assessment of the Amazon Venture Oil Spill in Proceedings of the 1989 Oil Spill
Conference p. 303 (1989); J. Brown, Successful Natural Resource Damage Claimfor a Coastal
Oil Spill in Proceedings of the 1989 Oil Spill Conference 293 (1989); P Biedenbender &
J. Michel, Response Strategies in a High Tidal Range Estuarine System: The Savannah River
Spill in Proceedings of the 1989 Oil Spill Conference 95 (1989).
36. Services refers to the flow of physical and biological functions performed by a
resource, including services to humans. Beach use, wildlife viewing, and recreational
fishing are examples of services that resources provide to people by direct use. The natural
system also provides ecological services, such as habitat, that contribute to the production
of wildlife and fisheries that are, in turn, used by people. In addition, some natural
resources may provide services beyond those associated with physical use, such as when
people enjoy reflecting upon the preservation of a unique natural environment that they
do not actually visit. This final category of services is referred to as nonuse (or "passive
use") services.
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spawning habitat for striped bass. It also supports a variety of other
anadromous fish, including American shad, hickory shad, blueback her-
ring, shortnose sturgeon and Atlantic sturgeon.37
The refuge also provides habitat for an abundance of birds. Ap-
proximately 2,700 acres of former diked rice fields are managed inten-
sively as freshwater impoundments for wintering waterfowl, wood
ducks, wading birds, shorebirds and other wildlife. The refuge pro-
vides nesting habitat for wood ducks, common gallinules, purple
gallinules, king rails and osprey. Many species of ducks use the refuge,
including green-and blue-winged teals, ring-necked ducks, black ducks,
mallards, pintails, and gadwalls. 38
In addition, the lower Savannah river supports an important
component of Savannah's recreation and tourism activities. The wildlife
refuge is heavily used for waterfowl hunting, wildlife observation,
commercial fishing and recreational fishing. The river also enhances
aesthetic conditions within the city of Savannah, providing an impor-
tant contribution to the local tourism industry. For example, the city of
Savannah contains a large historic district including a restored river-
front. Several historic sites are located along the river, including Fort
Jackson, which is on the National Register of Historic Places, and Fort
Pulaski National Monument, which is maintained by the National Park
Service.39
Thus, the aquatic environs in and around the lower Savannah
River system provide a variety of services to the public. Some of these
services, such as aesthetic qualities of the restored riverfront, are di-
rectly utilized by the public, while other services provide indirect use.
These include many of the ecological functions provided by wetlands,
for example, which support fish and wildlife that provide for recre-
ational uses. Still other services may support nonuse values (or so-called
"passive use" values) to the public, such as the mere knowledge that
members of an endangered species continue to exist. It is the aggregate
of these services that the trustee is delegated to protect on behalf of the
public.
The Amazon Venture spill had little observable direct impact on
fish and wildlife. The spill resulted in no observable fish kills, and only
a small number of oiled birds were observed. However, the spill re-
sulted in the oiling of a significant area of the wetlands that provides
habitat and other services to fish and wildlife, and ultimately to the
public.40 The spill resulted in moderate to heavy oiling of 650 acres of
wetlands and light oiling of an additional 690 acres of wetlands.41
37. Brown, supra note 36, at 293-94.
38. Brown, supra note 36, at 293.
39. Brown, supra note 35 at 293.
40. Brown, supra note 35, at 294.
41. Michel, supra note 35, at 303.
Winter 19941
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In response to the spill, the State of Georgia closed the refuge
to hunting and fishing for two to three weeks and closed the shell-
fishing season in areas downstream of the refuge. Both federal and
state trustees filed damage claims. The trustee agencies involved in-
cluded the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park
Service, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the
National Marine Fisheries Service and natural resource agencies from
the states of Georgia and South Carolina.42
Amazon Venture NRDA
The Amazon Venture spill occurred prior to the Ohio Decision,
but following the DOI's promulgation of the initial regulations in 1986,
and is purported to be the first case to use these regulations in a nat-
ural resource damage assessment.43 However, a full-scale damage as-
sessment was not conducted, because an out of court settlement was
expected. 44 Negotiations with the responsible party were based largely
on damages to wetlands,45 which were estimated by using three al-
ternative approaches. These were: a use-value approach based on ben-
efit transfer46 for values of lost days of hunting and fishing; a use-value
approach based on benefit transfer of per-acre wetland values; and a
replacement cost approach applied to the 650 acres of moderately to
heavily oiled wetlands. Thus, the first two approaches measure dam-
ages as lost-use value, and the third is based on restoration (or in this
case, replacement) costs.47
The first method calculated the lost use value of the wetlands
by estimating the number of lost user days for hunting and fishing,
and multiplying by values per day obtained from the economics liter-
ature. This calculation only accounted for consumptive uses of the re-
source, and thus does not include the lost values of such nonconsumptive
uses as bird watching, photography, hiking, boating, et cetera. The total
lost use value for hunting and fishing in the wetlands was calculated
as $275,368 to $414,024 using this method.48
42. Brown, supra note 35, at 294.
43. Brown, supra note 35, at 293.
44. Brown, supra note 35, at 295.
45. For simplicity, we will only discuss the wetlands damage claims in detail here.
There were additional categories of damages as well. These included effects on an
ongoing scientific study of the impacts of harbor development on the Savannah National
Wildlife Refuge, damages to fish and wildlife in the water column, and the costs of the
damage assessment itself.
46. Benefit transfer refers to the practice of using "off-the-shelf" information obtained
from existing studies to value lost services, rather than conducting site-specific studies
to measure these values.
47. Michel, supra note 35, at 303-06.
48. Michel, supra note 35, at 304-05. There were other categories of damages in
addition to wetlands. See supra note 45. These additional damages were estimated to be
$365,518.
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The second method was based on annualized values per acre
for a variety of wetlands services, and thus would include consump-
tive (e.g. hunting) and nonconsumptive (e.g., bird viewing) uses as well
as other potential services of wetlands, such as wildlife habitat, ero-
sion control, or flood hazard reduction. This method multiplied the
number of acres impacted by a range of estimated values per acre of
wetlands obtained from the literature. The resulting damage estimate
was calculated as $246,750 to $933,960. 49
Both of the lost-use value methods were based on the assump-
tion that the affected wetlands would recover naturally in a relatively
short period of time. Michel notes that
Iflortunately, the spill and subsequent cleanup did not cause
long-term damage to the root systems, and it was believed
that the marshes will recover over time. Based on the opin-
ion of various experts, the period over which services pro-
vided by wetlands will be lost was estimated to be two to
three years for the areas of heavy to moderate oil contami-
nation and six months for the lightly oiled wetlands.5°
The final method used was the replacement cost approach,
which is based on the cost of replacing the moderately and heavily oiled
wetlands. The replacement cost was calculated by multiplying the 650
acres affected times the cost per acre to plant new wetlands, resulting
in damage estimates of $1,300,000 to $2,730,000.51
However, because the moderately to heavily oiled acres were
expected to recover and thus were not permanently lost, the cost of re-
placing all of these acres is not an appropriate measure of damages in
this case. Rather, a portion of the wetland services are lost over the re-
covery, period. Furthermore, this replacement-cost approach overlooks
the services lost for the 690 lightly oiled acres.5 2 The case was settled
for $1.2 million, through negotiations based on the damage estimates
described above, and each trustee received a portion of the settlement,
based on the number of oiled wetland acres in their jurisdiction.53
The Amazon Venture damage assessment did not focus on restora-
tion, although one of the three damage measures was based on re-
placement cost of wetlands. In the future, cases will emphasize restoration
and thus will require different damage assessment methods. In the fol-
lowing sections, we discuss several important difficulties that courts
face in defining and implementing restoration. We then suggest meth-
49. Michel, supra note 35, at 304-05.
50. Michel, supra note 35, at 305.
51. Michel, supra note 35, at 306.
52. An alternative approach to complete replacement, replacing lost interim services
with new acres of wetlands, is discussed infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
53. Brown, supra note 35, at 295. Georgia received $500,000, South Carolina received
$240,000, and the U.S. government received $460,000. Brown, supra note 35, at 295.
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ods for addressing some of these problems, and illustrate our ideas
with examples based on the Amazon Venture case.
Factors That Complicate the Definition of Restoration
The evaluation of restoration alternatives is a critical compo-
nent of natural resource damage assessment, given that restoration is
the preferred method of compensating for damages, and that all com-
pensation collected must be spent on restoration, even compensation
collected for lost interim values of resources pending restoration. Al-
though restoration appears to be a straightforward means of making
the public whole, in practice restoration decisions present a complex,
multidimensional challenge.
The most obvious definition of restoration is that of returning
the set of injured resources to pre-spill conditions. In the Amazon Ven-
ture case, the strategy that focuses most directly upon restoring the
exact resource that was injured involves restoring the wetlands. This
simple definition of restoration is depicted in Figure 1. Injury to re-
sources results in a diminished flow of services. In general, these may
include ecological services which are indirectly valued by humans, di-
rect human uses, and conceivably nonuse (or "passive use") services.
Here, resource services prior to the spill are at level So
. 
In the
Amazon Venture case, So would represent the services of the fully func-
tioning wetlands, as described above (e.g., habitat for fish, wildlife and
birds). The spill occurs at time Ts, which results in a reduction in ser-
vices to S1. The resource recovers naturally over time, and returns to
pre-spill levels at time Tn.
The figure indicates that resource restoration actions are un-
dertaken at time T1, so that resource recovery occurs along an accel-
erated path, and full recovery occurs at time Tr. Area A represents the
loss in value associated with the reduction in resources over the re-
covery period, and area B represents the additional losses in public
value that would occur under natural restoration.5 4 Compensation based
on restoration is thus determined as the cost of restoration plus area
A, the lost interim value of the resources.5 5 The question of gross pro-
portions between restoration costs and the value of lost resources is
determined by the relative magnitudes of restoration costs and the dol-
lar value of area B, the additional losses in public value that would
occur under natural restoration.
Unfortunately, defining restoration is not so simple. Efforts to
restore resources are complicated by several factors, including deter-
54. The actual calculation of these lost values would involve calculating a monetary
value for the reductions in services represented by areas A and B. For a discussion of
measuring social value in monetary terms, see supra note 6.
55. In this example, if compensation were to be based on lost value of the resources
rather than restoration, the compensation collected would be the sum of the dollar values
of areas A plus B.
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mination of a baseline for restoration, the possibility that full restora-
tion may not be feasible, and difficulties in identifying restoration al-
ternatives that make the public whole.
Determining a Baseline for Restoration
The first step in determining restoration is to establish a base-
line level of services, and to quantify the reduction in services caused
by the spill. The actual physical measurement of injury and resulting
service reductions is likely to be a difficult task in itself. For example,
it is difficult to identify and measure all ecological services obtained
from wetlands, and the extent to which these service flows are reduced
by spill impacts. Indeed, even more readily observable impacts, such
as bird mortality, can be very difficult to estimate accurately, since manx
birds killed by a spill sink, are disbursed, or are eaten by scavengers.
Measuring the extent of injury is further complicated by the fact that
resources change over time in often unpredictable ways, thus con-
founding determination of the baseline.
Because resources change over time, resource services might
have increased or decreased in the absence of a spill. For example, wet-
land acreage may change over time due to erosion or sea level rise, or
bird populations may decline (or expand) over time due to changes in
habitat that have no connection to the spill. Figure 2 depicts the base-
line time paths for a resource under three scenarios. If the resource ser-
vices would have declined even in the absence of the spill, the resource
would follow path 1, natural recovery occurs at T1, and the appropri-
ate measure of losses over the recovery period is area A. If the resource
is in equilibrium, so that the level of services provided is constant in
the absence of the spill, the resource would follow path 2, natural re-
covery occurs at time T2, and the appropriate measure of losses over
the recovery period is area A+B. If the resource services would have
increased in the absence of the spill, the baseline time path is path 3,
natural recovery occurs at time T3, and the appropriate measure of losses
over the recovery period is area A+B+C.
The theoretically correct baseline condition to use when mea-
suring damages is the without-spill level, rather than the pre-spill level.
In case 1, returning resources to pre-spill levels is excessive, perhaps
even infeasible if the ecosystem is unable to support larger stocks. Con-
versely, in case 3, returning stocks to pre-spill levels is inadequate.
However, data may not be available to firmly establish without-spill
levels of the resource. In that case, determination of the without-spill
baseline, and thus the extent of injury, will not be straightforward.
56. See, e.g., National Academy of Sciences, Oil in the Sea: Inputs, Fates and Effects
432 (1985).
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Determination of the baseline was an issue in Idaho v. Southern
Refrigerated Transport Inc., where fish in the Little Salmon River were
killed by a spill of agricultural fungicide from an overturned truck.5
7
Idaho argued for determining the baseline number of fish using an av-
erage of fish counts for each of the three years prior to the spill.8 How-
ever, the Court opted for measuring the pre-spill level using only the
fish count data for 1987, the year of the spill, rather than the three-year
average.59
There was an additional issue regarding the extent to which
the population had recovered in the years following the spill. John Loomis
and Peter Anderson, who served respectively as expert witness and
lead attorney for the State of Idaho, indicate that the fishery in ques-
tion was being reestablished at the time of the spill. Thus, the popu-
lation would be expected to be increasing in the years following the
spill. Consequently, the appropriate baseline for the population, de-
fined by the without-spill level, would be greater than the pre-spill
level, which is analogous to the baseline represented by time path 3 in
Figure 2. However, this framework was argued to be speculative by
the defendant, and the before-after framework was adopted by the court.°
This is analogous to assuming a constant time path, depicted by path
2 in Figure 2.
Defining the baseline is further complicated by the stochastic,
or uncertain, nature of natural resources. For example, a spill may kill
5,000 seabirds. Yet populations of these seabirds might be in the mil-
lions, and random fluctuations in the population might be orders of
magnitude larger than the spill-related mortality. In this case, it may
not be possible to have any confidence in measures that attempt to de-
termine the extent to which the population has recovered from the spill-
related injuries.
Finally, in order to accurately assess the baseline and extent of
injury, data for both control and impacted sites are needed. The best
way of collecting such data is to sample pairs of control and impacted
sites both before and after the event.61 However, it may not be prac-
tical to collect pre-spill information in many situations, such as in areas
that are large and diverse, areas where spills are unpredictable, and
areas where site-specific temporal changes are likely to occur. There-
fore, it may often be necessary to rely only on data collected after a
57. Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated Transp. Inc., No. 88-1279,1991 WL 22479 (D. Idaho
Jan. 24, 1991). See also J. Loomis & P. Anderson, Idaho v. Southern Refrigerated, in Natural
Resource Damages: Law and Economics 389 (K. Ward & J. Duffield, eds., 1992).
58. Southern Refrigerated Transp. Inc., 1991 WL 22479, at *13.
59. Id.
60. Loomis & Anderson, supra note 57, at 412.
61. T. Dean et al., Damage Assessment in Coastal Habitats: Lessons Learned from Exxon
Valdez, in Proceedings of the 1993 International Oil Spill Conference 695 (1993).
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spill has occurred. In this case, problems can arise because of unknown
differences between the control and impacted sites.
Making the Public Whole
The strictest definition of restoration is the return of the pre-
cise resources that were injured to baseline conditions. However, even
assuming that the baseline and extent of injury can be unambiguously
determined, it often may be beyond the current state of the art to re-
store some resources fully. It is also possible that restoration costs will
be "grossly disproportionate" to the value of the injured resources. Thus,
in many cases, it may be impossible or undesirable to restore the pre-
cise resources that were injured. Under these circumstances, compen-
sation for injured resources can take the form of creating, protecting,
or enhancing substitute resources that provide "equivalent" functions
or natural resource services. Under the proposed OPA NRDA regula-
tions, the definitions of rehabilitation and replacement may be inter-
preted as allowing such actions.62
Thus, in the Amazon Venture case, the services provided by wet-
lands could be restored by focusing restoration actions on resources
other than the oiled wetlands themselves. For example, alternative
habitats for fish and wildlife could be provided or enhanced, thus re-
placing the ecological services provided by wetlands. One component
of a program for enhancing a bird habitat might be to build duck boxes
that would provide nesting habitat for wood ducks. Alternatively,
restoration actions could focus directly on human uses, such as pro-
viding new observation towers for viewing wildlife, thus restoring or
enhancing direct service flows to humans. These are illustrations of the
so-called 'landscape' approach, whereby restoration efforts focus on
the services provided by the overall ecosystem, rather than the specific
resource that was injured. This approach is becoming recognized as a
more effective means of carrying out restoration programs.
However, it is not straightforward to determine "equivalent"
services, either from a scientific viewpoint, or especially from a social
viewpoint. Under the public trust doctrine, the trustee acts on behalf
of the public interest in natural resource amenities, not on behalf of the
resource itself. Consequently, one definition of "equivalent" resources
might be resources that are equally valued by society. In many cases,
the public interest in natural resources can best be protected by pro-
viding equally valued resource services, rather than restoring precisely
what was injured. The substitution of equally valued resources can pro-
vide a feasible and cost-effective means of achieving the goal of restor-
ing, while conforming to the legal doctrine of public trust.
62. 59 Fed. Reg. 1169 (1994).
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Consequently, resource restoration cannot be viewed as a purely
technical issue. It is not only important to select a feasible method for
restoring resources but, in order to identify restoration actions that make
the public whole, it is also necessary to consider public values for re-
sources. Despite the importance of balancing ecological and social
gains, to date there has been little or no coordination between natural
scientists and social scientists towards establishing decisionmaking
tools that balance gains of different kinds. It is particularly important
to have established techniques for use in natural resource damage as-
sessment, where lack of guidance may complicate and lengthen the ne-
gotiation process.
Restoration as a Means of "Making Whole"
The National Academy of Science report on restoration recog-
nizes the difficulties associated with restoration planning, and states
that it may be necessary to establish methods of project evaluation such
that
comparisons between projects become possible, clear, and
meaningful .... Thus, thorough evaluation of a restoration
may become a complex, multidisciplinary process involving
a great deal of data collection and necessitating that the re-
sulting body of basically incomparable or unrelated data be
reduced to manageable terms by using multiattribute deci-
sion techniques.63
Such methods, if based on common sense and sound theory,
can serve to create a foundation for agreement between trustees and
responsible parties, thus avoiding litigation and saving time and money.
In contrast, the absence of established methods will impede swift and
reasonable settlements. An important first step in the development of
such methods is a definition of restoration as resource-based compen-
sation that can make the public whole through the provision of "equiv-
alent" or substitute resources.
An Economic Definition of Restoration
This section presents an economic definition of restoration.
Those with economics training are strongly encouraged to read the ap-
pendix, which contains a more rigorous presentation of the following
material.
Most of the natural resource damage assessment work to date
by economists attempts to calculate the value of lost resource services
due to a spill. The economic definition of monetary compensation for
63. National Academy of Sciences, Restoration of Aquatic Ecosystems 65 (1992).
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lost services is the amount of money that, when paid to an individual,
equates the individual's level of well-being after the spill to the level
of well-being in the absence of the spill and without compensation.
Thus, monetary compensation for lost services is the difference
between the with-spill and without-spill levels of income needed to
achieve a fixed level of well-being. For example, in the Amazon Venture
case, one of the services, a lost day of recreational fishing, was valued
at $25.64 This implies that the average angler would be just as well off
going fishing as receiving $25 but having to forgo the day of fishing.
Analogously, resource-based compensation can be defined as
the amount and type of restoration that equates the individual's with-
out-spill and with-spill levels of well-being. For example, lost wetlands
services could be compensated for by enhancing wildlife habitat, thus
increasing population levels to the point where the social value of the
natural resource assets is maintained. This definition of restoration is
consistent with the legal doctrine of public trust, where the objective
of the trustee is to make the public whole in terms of maintaining the
public interest in the resource assets and associated services, rather than
to make the environment whole regardless of the public interest.
Typically, interim losses are defined in terms of the monetary
value of lost services. However, under CERCLA and OPA, individuals
do not receive monetary compensation for these lost services. For ex-
ample, in the Amazon Venture case the anglers who are unable to fish
are not paid the $25 per day for lost fishing days. Instead, the trustee
must use the total amount of compensation received to restore re-
sources.
There is no direct link between the value of lost services and
the cost of restoring "equivalent" services. Thus, if anglers could not
fish because of fish kills, for example, it might be possible to stock fish
from hatcheries. However, there is no reason to expect the monetary
value of lost services (e.g., the value of fishing) to bear any relation to
the costs needed to restore lost services (e.g., the cost of hatching and
stocking fish). Given that all money collected must be used to restore
resource services, it is more logical to base compensation on the cost
of restoring equivalent services.
The amount of compensation required to make the public whole
is the least amount of money that is sufficient to provide a set of re-
sources that maintains the social value of the natural resource assets.
Consequently, depending upon how expensive restoration programs
are, the value of the lost services could be far greater than, or far less
than, the amount of money required to make the public whole through
resource restoration. Therefore, the monetary value of lost services does
not measure compensation required to make the public whole through
64. Michel, supra note 36, at 305 (Table 1).
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resource restoration. However, it is necessary for determining whether
restoration costs are, grossly disproportionate to benefits.65
In summary, monetary compensation is the amount of money
that must be paid to the public in order to fully compensate them for
losses suffered, i.e. to make them whole. Resource-based compensa-
tion is the amount and type of resource services that must be provided
to the public to fully compensate them. These definitions of monetary
compensation and resource compensation are both based on economic
theory, and are both consistent with the legal concept of making whole.
However, monetary compensation balances a payment of money for
lost resources, while resource based compensation balances restored
resources for lost resources. Both types of compensation involve chal-
lenging issues for implementation. However, the attempt to estimate
monetary values for compensation has the additional complication of
requiring people to place a dollar value on the environment.
Steps in Determining the Appropriate Level of Resource-Based
Compensation
One way to determine sets of equivalent restoration actions is
by using information from a contingent choice survey, where a sam-
ple of respondents are presented with alternative feasible programs
for restoration, described in terms of the resource services provided
and the time frame for each. These respondents could be comprised of
knowledgeable experts, representatives of different interest groups or
a random sample of the general public. 66 The respondents would be
asked to choose the most preferred restoration programs, or to rank
alternative programs. Employing standard methods of analysis,67 such
a survey could be used to determine the appropriate level and type of
resource-based compensation by identifying "equally valued" resources
65. "Grossly disproportionate" can be defined using standard techniques of cost-
benefit analysis, as suggested by the court in Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior,
880 F.2d 432, 443 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989) or by some other standard, such as the 10 factors
suggested by DOI in their Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, see supra note 26.
66. It has been argued that the public may not be sufficiently knowledgeable about
resources or ecosystems to provide meaningful responses to surveys. One solution to
this problem is to interview more knowledgeable respondents who serve as representatives
of the various interests of the public. Another solution is to integrate technical views of
experts and views of the public when developing and implementing the survey. For
example, SAGE is one method that was developed as a means of accomplishing this.
For information on the SAGE method, see E. Hyman & B. Stiftel, Combining Facts and
Values in Environmental Impact Assessment: Theories and Techniques (1988); R. Hageman
& V. Witkowski, The SAGE Method in Endangered Species Management: Constructing Proxy
Utility Functions to Measure Relative Values, in Proceeding of the W133 Meetings (1991)
(held in Monterey, California).
67. See, e.g., D. McFadden, Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior, in
Frontiers of Econometrics (P. Zarembka, ed.,1973); J. Opaluch et al., Evaluating Impacts
from Noxious Facilities: Including Public Preferences in Current Siting Mechanisms, 24 J.
Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 41 (1993).
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to restore, in terms of social preferences. That is, we would identify
levels of alternative restoration programs that result in equal well-being
for a "representative" individual. This is consistent with DOI's re-
quirement, stated in the NPR for the CERCLA regulations, to identify
a "reasonable number" of restoration alternatives.
If desired, the restoration programs could be restricted to sets
of resources that are substantially "similar" to the resources injured, or
they could include a broad spectrum of possible resource enhancement
programs. For example, at one extreme, alternative actions for restor-
ing a population of seabirds could be restricted to those that target the
particular species and age class of seabirds that were injured. Alterna-
tively, restoration actions could be more broadly defined to target other
species of birds where restoration actions may be more feasible or less
costly, or where the species are viewed as "more desirable". At the other
extreme, the set of restoration alternatives could include actions that
target completely different resources, such as fish or wetlands.
As noted above,68 such broad definitions of "comparable re-
sources" could be consistent with the definitions of rehabilitation and
replacement in the proposed OPA NRDA regulations.The broader the
set of restoration alternatives that is allowed, the more likely it is that
we can identify a restoration program that protects the public interest
at a cost that is not "grossly disproportionate" to benefits and at a cost
that responsible parties find acceptable, such that compensation and
restoration can proceed promptly, without the need for time consum-
ing and expensive litigation.
This point can be illustrated by the following simple example.
A spill might kill 700 seabirds, but it may not be technically feasible to
restore these seabird populations, or doing so may be extremely ex-
pensive. Instead, one could find alternative resources that are viewed
as "equally valuable," but that can be restored at much lower cost. For
example, a survey of the public might find that a (hypothetical) pro-
gram that restores 700 seabirds is "equally desirable" as a program that
restores 500 waterfowl or one that restores 1,800 adult salmon. This de-
fines alternatives that provide "equivalent" resources.
In the case of the Amazon Venture, natural resource damages re-
sulted largely from impacts to wetlands. The money received in set-
tlement was spent on a variety of projects, both related and unrelated
to the actual spill injuries, but no direct restoration actions focused on
wetlands. The federal government spent part of the settlement funds
to continue a study of the Savannah National Wildlife Refuge for an
extra year, and part of the funds to study and implement means of pro-
tecting the refuge from future spills. The State of Georgia used their
portion of the settlement for five different restoration projects. These
68. Supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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were enhancement of shellfish and finfish resources, improvements to
a state fish hatchery, compiling data on, and monitoring, the Savan-
nah River, constructing wildlife observation platforms, and enhance-
ments to Fort Jackson. South Carolina used their funds for assessing
biological resources and effects of contaminants on those resources in
the lower Savannah and Wright Rivers, developing a geographical in-
formation system for coastal areas, and establishing an escrow account
for future spill response.69 No attempt was made to compare the re-
sources actually restored with the resource damages resulting from the
spill to determine whether compensation was adequate to make the
public whole.
If our method had been applied to this case, the first step would
be to identify feasible restoration options. The second step would be
to determine the level of the restoration options that would be "equiv-
alent" to the lost services due to the Amazon Venture spill. Next, one
would determine which "equivalent" restoration alternative is least
costly. This identifies the most cost effective restoration plan that makes
the public whole. Finally, one would make sure that the cost of this
plan is not grossly disproportionate to the benefit, by comparing the
cost of carrying out this plan with the value of the resources restored.
Thus, the benefit obtained from restoration is explicitly balanced against
the services lost due to the spill. Monetary damages are then estimated
as the cost of the selected restoration plan, plus lost interim values for
services of the resources.
Resource-Based Compensation for Lost Interim Services
One approach to determining compensation for lost interim ser-
vices pending restoration is to place a monetary value on the lost in-
terim services, collect this money, and then determine how to best
spend the money on resource enhancement activities. This is essen-
tially what was done in the Amazon Venture case to compensate for lost
interim services of wetlands pending natural recovery. An alternative
approach is to provide resource-based compensation for lost interim
services by restoring beyond the baseline level, such that the additional
services compensate the public for the interim losses. This requires that
we determine the resources that make the public whole and the cost
of providing those resources. This approach to compensation is more
consistent with the public trust doctrine, which requires that the pub-
lic be made whole, and with the statutes, which require that the funds
collected for lost interim services be spent on natural resources.
Using this method requires that we determine relative values
of resources. However, it places less emphasis on estimating monetary
values for resources, which people may often find difficult or impos-
69. Brown, supra note 35, at 295.
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sible to express. Some measure of monetary values may still be neces-
sary for determining when restoration costs are grossly dispropor-
tionate to benefits received. However, the use of estimated monetary
values in this context may be less controversial, and lower standards
of accuracy may be acceptable, than in the context of assessing mone-
tary damages, as one only needs to determine the "gross proportion"
of the values being compared.
Figure 3 depicts this measure of compensation. Here, the ini-
tial level of resource services is So. The spill mortality reduces the ser-
vices to S1. Enhancement actions are then taken to restore the resource
services to the level SR>S0. The level of restoration, SR, is determined
so as to balance area B, which represents the services obtained from re-
source enhancement, with area A, which represents losses over the re-
covery period, after accounting for the relevant discount factor.70
Hence, losses in resources over the period prior to recovery are redressed
by gains in resources over a future time period.
We will illustrate this suggested approach using information
from the Amazon Venture. One possible action is based on replacing the
wetland services lost over the recovery period with an equal number
of discounted "acre-years" of wetland services. In this case lost wet-
land services are compensated for with additional wetland services.
Specifically, we calculate the number of wetland acres provided in per-
petuity that is required to balance the temporary losses in services over
the recovery period for all impacted wetlands. Our proposed approach
is consistent with the post-Ohio preference for restoration, but extends
restoration one step further by using restored resource services beyond
the baseline to compensate for lost interim services of resources pend-
ing recovery.
Replacing Lost Wetland Services With "Acre-Equivalents"
For the purposes of this example, we have made several sim-
plifying assumptions, based on the information presented in Michel
and Brown. 71 We adopt all dollar figures presented by Michel. We as-
sume that the oiled wetlands provide no services immediately follow-
ing the impact, but that the services recover linearly over time. Specifically,
following Michel, we assume natural recovery in six months for the
70. Compensation can be thought of as providing a resource that is of equal value
to that which was lost. A natural resource that provides a flow of services over time may
be viewed as a capital asset, whose value is defined as the discounted value of its service
flow. C. Clark, Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable
Resources 68 (1976). Thus, an acre of wetlands provided today is worth more than an
acre of wetlands provided a year from now because it supplies services over that period.
The administratively set discount rate for natural resource damage assessments under
Federal regulation is currently 10 percent. See 51 Fed. Reg. 27750 (1986) (citing Office of
Managment and Budget, Circular A-94 Revised (Mar. 27, 1992).
71. See Michel, supra note 35: Brown, supra note 36.
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lightly oiled wetlands, and in three years for the moderately to heav-
ily oiled wetlands.72 Note that the assumption of zero services fol-
lowing the injury may lead to overstated damages because it does not
allow for the provision of partial services by injured wetlands73 thus
overstating the services that must be restored. This is particularly per-
tinent for the 690 acres of lightly oiled wetlands.
First, we calculated the total discounted acre-years for the in-
jured wetlands, assuming linear recovery. This was calculated using a
ten percent discount rate, which was the rate used by the trustees in
their calculation of lost wetland values.74 Second, we determined the
level of wetlands creation that was required to provide the discounted
equivalent acres. This was calculated as:
Tg 00
(1 + r) -t WL(t) = . (1+r)tWG(t)
t.O t-TR
where t represents time in years, TR is the time at which full recovery
occurs, WL(t) is the level of loss in resource services at time t, prior to
full recovery, WG(t) is the level of gains in services provided by restora-
tion beyond the baseline and r is the discount rate. Thus, we are bal-
ancing discounted losses in wetlands services over the recovery period
(represented by area A in Figure 3, above) against the discounted gains
in acreage provided by restoration beyond the baseline (represented by
area B in Figure 3). This provides one option for restoring lost services
over the interim period, to be included among the "reasonable num-
ber" of alternatives to be compared, as required by DOI in the NPR.
It was assumed that creation of these wetland acres would
occur one year following the spill. It was also assumed that it would
take five years for the created wetlands to provide the full flow of ser-
vices provided by mature wetlands. By using the above procedure and
solving the equation for W. , we found that a total of 153.6 acres of
wetlands provided in perpetuity contributes the discounted "acre equiv-
alent" for the temporary loss in services over the recovery period from
the oiled wetlands in the Savannah River. This contrasts with the re-
placement cost approach presented in Michel, which is based on the
complete replacement of the 650 moderately to heavily oiled acres.
The final step is to calculate the cost of creating these wetlands.
Using the replacement costs presented by Michel, which ranged from
72. Michel, supra note 35, at 305.
73. That is, in many cases lightly oiled wetlands will continue to provide services,
although possibly at a reduced level. For example, wetlands with lightly stained vegetation
may still provide detritus, which helps to support the overall food web. Similarly,
wetlands with lightly stained vegetation may still provide effective removal of various
pollutants from the waters.
74. Michel, supra note 35, at 305.
[Vol. 34
NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE
$2,000 to $4,200 per acre, the total cost would range from $307,164 to
$645,045. 75 If this restoration action turned out to be the most cost ef-
fective option that makes the public whole, this amount of compensa-
tion would be collected and used to implement the restoration plan for
the 153.6 acres.
Comparison of Benefits and Costs of the Plan
Using information from Michel, we can compare the cost of restor-
ing lost interim services with the estimates of the value of the lost ser-
vices. The trustee calculations of lost use values of the wetlands pending
natural recovery resulted in a range of value from $246,750 to $993,960.76
Thus, based on these estimates, the cost of restoring the lost interim
services is comparable to, and bounded by, the estimates of the value
of lost services, so that the benefits of restoring the lost interim services
may exceed the costs.
It should be emphasized, however, that the appropriate restora-
tion alternative is the most cost-effective solution. This example was
based on a narrow definition of equivalent services, whereby lost wet-
land services were replaced with wetland acre-equivalents. In an ac-
tual damage assessment other restoration alternatives should be
considered, and the appropriate selection is the restoration alternative
that makes the public whole at least cost. For example, rather than cre-
ating additional acres of wetlands, other options could be considered,
such as enhancing other wildlife habitat or enhancing public access.
The primary distinction between our suggested approach and the ap-
proach more typically used, such as that applied in the Amazon Venture
case, is that our approach includes an explicit balancing between the
services obtained from restoration actions and the services lost due to
the spill.
CONCLUSIONS
Traditional methods of damage assessment have tended to focus
either on economic methods of estimating the value of resource ser-
vices lost due to a spill or on scientific studies of resource restoration.
This paper suggests an alternative approach that integrates legal con-
cepts based on the public trust doctrine, economic methods of deter-
mining compensation, and scientific approaches to restoration.
The approach is based on a definition of restoration as resource-
based compensation that provides a remedy for spill-related damages.
This approach identifies alternative restoration actions that provide re-
75. Michel, supra note 35, at 306.
76. Michel, supra note 35, at 306 (Table 2).
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source services that are "equally desirable" to society as the services
lost due to the spill. Thus, there is an explicit balancing between the
benefits obtained from restoration and the losses due to the spill. In
comparison, previous methods of damage assessment make no such
explicit balancing, so that there is no attempt to determine whether
restoration actions make the public whole for injuries due to the spill.
Under our approach, the least costly restoration alternative that
makes the public whole is selected as the cost effective restoration plan.
We also suggest the idea of resource-based compensation for lost in-
terim services, whereby restored services are balanced against services
lost over the recovery period. We illustrate our methods using the Ama-
zon Venture oil spill as a case study.
The greater the flexibility that is allowed in defining "equiva-
lent" resources, the more likely it is that we can identify alternatives
that serve the public interest at a cost that is not "grossly dispropor-
tionate" to the value of the resource, and at a cost that is acceptable to
the responsible party. Hence, this could help to facilitate prompt, rea-
sonable and mutually agreeable solutions to natural resource damage
actions, and could help to circumvent lengthy and expensive litiga-
tion.
Appendix: A Technical Definition of Restoration
This appendix provides a technical economic definition of re-
source-based compensation, which is equivalent to the definition pro-
vided in the section entitled An Economic Definition of Restoration.
Monetary compensation for lost services is defined such that
utility immediately after the spill is equated to utility in the absence
of the spill (with no compensation). This is based on the usual defini-
tion of Hicksian compensation:
U(P,Y,NR °) = U(PY+C,NR')
where U(*) is the utility function, P is a vector of prices, Y is income,
NR° is the without-spill vector of natural resource services, C is mon-
etary compensation, and NRl is the reduced vector of natural resource
services following the spill. Thus, monetary compensation is the dif-
ference between the with-spill and without-spill levels of income needed
to achieve the fixed level of utility. The aggregate level of compensa-
tion required can be calculated by summing over all individuals. This
is often calculated by estimating compensation required by a "repre-
sentative" or "average" individual and multiplying by the size of the
relevant population.
If restoration is defined as resource-based compensation, it can
be expressed as:
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U(P,Y0,NRO) = U(P,Y0 ,NRI + R)
where R is resource-based compensation in the form of a vector of re-
sources provided through some set of restoration actions. The goal, then
is:
Min C(R)
R
such that
U(P,Y,NRO) = U(PY,NRI+R)
and
C(R) < FGD * [E(PNR 0,U°0)-E(PNR',U0 )]
where C(R) is the cost associated with the restoration program R, FGD
is a factor of gross proportions, E(.) is the expenditure function, and
UO=U(P,Y,NRO) is the without-spill level of utility. Thus, the term in
brackets represents the monetary compensation required to obtain the
without-spill level of utility. The first constraint requires that the pub-
lic be made whole through resource-based compensation, R, and the
second constraint requires that the cost of restoration not be grossly
disproportionate to the value of the restored resource. A constraint of
this form is implicit in Ohio, where the court suggests "the rule might
hinge on the relationship between restoration cost and use value (e.g.,
damages are limited to three-times the amount of use value).". 77 Thus,
the Court's suggestion for "grossly disproportionate" would be based
on a factor of gross proportions (FGD) of 3.
With the exception of the second constraint, this equation sys-
tem is equivalent to the traditional expenditure minimization problem
of utility theory. This formulation is dual to the monetary compensa-
tion problem, which is based on the assumption of utility maximiza-
tion subject to an income constraint.
77. Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 443 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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